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Abstract
We examine the role of political ideology in portfolio formation by studying a unique set of
investors whose ideology can be precisely captured by a well-defined, continuous measure and
whose personal asset allocation decisions are mandatorily disclosed – namely, the members of the
U.S. Congress. As such, we overcome important methodological issues facing previous work in
this area. We find that politicians with similar beliefs hold similar portfolios and that more lib-
eral members engage in more socially responsible investing (SRI), even within political parties.
Politicians disproportionately favor the SRI categories that reflect their favorite issues, while
salience plays an important role in activating their ideologically-based preferences for SRI. In
addition, more ideological investors are less likely to engage in the quid pro quo behavior doc-
umented in Tahoun (2014). We conclude that ideology is a pervasive psychological factor that
governs decisions across the domains of politics, investing, and even ethics.
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1. Introduction
Classical finance theory depicts investors as caring only about the expected risks and returns
that financial assets, such as stocks and mutual funds, can offer. However, there is considerable
evidence that investors are not only concerned with monetary payoffs, but also exhibit tastes
for assets as consumption goods. As a prime example, some investors exhibit a preference for
corporate social responsibility that can lead them to favor socially conscious firms and even exclude
irresponsible firms from their portfolios in a process known as “socially responsible investing” (SRI).
The popularity of SRI has grown rapidly, as SRI-dedicated institutional funds have increased from
$639 billion in assets under management in 1994 to $8.72 trillion in 2015, or one out of every five
dollars of money managed in the United States.1 This phenomena is important to consider, since,
as argued by Fama and French (2007), investor tastes can have crucial implications for asset pricing.
A growing literature argues that an important source of investor tastes comes from their polit-
ical ideology.2 Political ideology typically refers to where an individual falls along the traditional
liberal-conservative spectrum and seems to be related to cognitive approaches. For example, con-
servatives often appear to be more deliberate when making decisions, while liberals have a greater
tolerance for ambiguity and an openness to new experiences.3 There is also evidence that polit-
ical beliefs stem from deeply rooted moral intuitions, and that the differences across people on
the ideological spectrum can be traced to the different weights they place on moral values (Haidt
(2012)). For example, liberals have been shown to care relatively more about the moral domain
of care/harm (caring for the welfare of others) than do conservatives (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek
(2009)). Research has shown that liberals are more concerned about environmental issues because
they view them in moral terms through this care/harm frame, whereas conservatives typically do
not moralize environmental issues because they are not framed within the moral domains that
conservatives find most important (Feinberg and Willer (2013)).4 Because ideological differences
1U.S. Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment. See http://www.ussif.org/sribasics.
2E.g., Bonaparte, Kumar, and Page (2012), Bonaparte and Kumar (2013), Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), and
Kaustia and Torstila (2011).
3E.g., Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007) and Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003).
4Moral foundations theory (Haidt and Joseph (2004)) posits that there are five primary moral domains that
people care about: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation.
Liberals tend to care most about care/harm and fairness/cheating, whereas conservatives care about all five, but
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are associated with deep foundational differences in human psychology, political ideology is likely
to be related to investor tastes and, therefore, portfolio choice.
In this paper, we examine how political ideology influences investor decisions by studying the
portfolio choices of the members of the U.S. Congress. Specifically, we ask four questions. First,
do politicians with similar political ideologies choose similar portfolios? Second, if politicians share
similar ideologies, do they also share a taste for specific investments consistent with their beliefs,
such as SRI? Third, how does salience impact the expression of ideological preferences? Fourth, does
ideology affect how politicians’ portfolios are influenced by campaign contributions? Finally, we
discuss a number of extensions and robustness checks, such as politicians’ pet issues, the relationship
between risk and SRI, window-dressing around elections, and preferences for local firms.
There are two important reasons to study the investment behavior of the members of the
U.S. Congress. First, they provide an ideal laboratory to understand the relationship between
ideology and portfolio choice because we can cleanly identify both their ideology (from their voting
records) as well as their portfolios and trading activity (from their required financial disclosures).
Therefore, we can sidestep various methodological issues facing the past literature on how political
values influence portfolio decisions. Much of the previous literature relies on campaign contributions
made by firm executives or fund managers to infer political ideology, or uses survey data.5 The
use of campaign contributions is confounded by the fact that donations are voluntary and could
be made for strategic, non-ideological reasons (Gordon, Hafer, and Landa (2007)). For example,
a manager might donate money to a politician to increase her political influence or to cater to a
particular investor clientele, such as people who prefer SRI. For instance, a manager that runs a
socially responsible mutual fund would have an incentive to contribute to liberal-leaning politicians
to improve the value of her fund’s investments, rather than to reflect her belief system. Moreover,
campaign contributions cannot measure the intensity of an individual’s ideological beliefs along the
ideological spectrum and, instead, just allow for the separation of donors along party lines.6 For
relatively more than liberals about loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. For a detailed
treatment of moral foundations theory, see Haidt (2012).
5E.g., Bonaparte, Kumar, and Page (2012), Bonaparte and Kumar (2013), Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), and
Hong and Kostovetsky (2012).
6As Luigi Zingales notes, “...when donations start to exceed $5,000, donors are not just expressing a political
preference, they are trying to influence future policies.” See https://newschicagobooth.uchicago.edu/about/
newsroom/press-releases/2016/2016-02-04.
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instance, during the primary elections of 2016, the more liberal candidate Bernie Sanders raised
less than one percent of his campaign funds from donations larger than $5,000, compared to 38%
for the more moderate Hillary Clinton.
By focusing on the investment choices of members of Congress, we can employ a continuous
measure of ideology based on their voting behavior. The continuous measure that we use identi-
fies where a politician falls on the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum (Poole and Rosenthal
(2007)).7 Poole (2007) shows that legislators’ ideological voting patterns are remarkably consis-
tent over time, in order to rule out strategic factors that might affect congressional voting. Levitt
(1996) finds that ideology is the primary determinant of U.S. politician voting behavior, with voter
preferences and party platform playing secondary roles.
Also, other work in this area uses survey-based data, which could suffer from nonresponse bias
and typically have limited information about the investment choices of respondents. In contrast,
we use the detailed holdings of U.S. Congress members, which are required to be disclosed by
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.8 Furthermore, unlike fund or firm managers, members of
Congress are managing their personal investments. Therefore, we can more cleanly infer personal
tastes from their portfolio choices, rather than from choices that cater to other stakeholders.
Second, it is particularly interesting to understand how the political ideology of elected officials
influences their own personal financial decisions, as this can shed light on whether their decisions
reflect “behavioral consistency” across personal and political domains. Behavioral consistency, the
theory that people tend to exhibit similar behaviors across diverse domains, has been put forth in
the corporate finance literature as an explanation for links between CEO and firm traits.9 Voters
are likely to form their support for a politician based on their perception of the politician’s ideology,
perhaps garnered from their political parties, speeches, or prior voting behavior (e.g., see Bartels
(2000) and Gerber and Huber (2009)). If politicians espouse certain principles in the public realm,
7We use the first dimension of the Common Space DW-Nominate Score in order to capture the heterogeneity of
political beliefs within parties. See Section 2 and http://voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htm for
more.
8See http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/disclosure.php. Investment assets greater than $1,000 must be re-
ported. These assets include securities, such as equity and debt positions, mutual funds, hedge funds, real estate,
bank accounts, and business ownership.
9For instance, CEOs that avoid debt in their personal lives manage firms with lower leverage, and CEOs that are
more personally tax aggressive manage firms with more aggressive tax policy (e.g., Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker
(2012) and Chyz (2013)).
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but act inconsistently with those principles in their personal lives, then that would indicate a lack
of behavioral consistency. This could give voters pause when evaluating candidates, out of fear
that politicians may be saying one thing, while believing another. In fact, studying investment
behavior is an especially important window into an individual’s true beliefs. Prior literature has
demonstrated that individuals may say one thing, but, with money on the line, end up behaving
differently and revealing their actual beliefs around political issues.10 To put it another way, voters
have a compelling interest in knowing if politicians “put their money where their mouth is.”
We find that the investment decisions of members of Congress (members) is influenced by their
political ideology in several ways. First, members who are ideologically more similar to one another
have more similar equity portfolios, controlling for other individual characteristics, such as their
age, wealth, state, and the source of their campaign contributions. Moreover, the relation holds
within parties, suggesting that ideology, and not just party affiliation, affects portfolio formation
in a general way.
Next, we examine whether members’ investment decisions are consistent with their political
ideology by studying their decision to engage in socially responsible investing (SRI). There are
many politically charged and polarizing issues on which liberals and conservatives have quite dis-
parate views. For example, liberals tend to oppose oil and gas drilling to protect the environment,
while conservatives tend to support fossil fuel development to promote economic growth. If an
individual’s investment decisions are consistent with their ideology, then we should find that more
liberal members have a greater preference for SRI.
Using data on firms’ socially responsible behaviors from the MSCI Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini
and Co. database (KLD), we indeed find that more liberal members invest more in socially respon-
sible firms, and in particular, those with a strong track record with respect to diversity, employee
relations, and environmental protection. We also find that this political taste is related to specific
industries, as liberals hold a lower percentage of industries commonly screened out in SRI, such as
tobacco and oil firms, as well as a lower percentage of industries found to outperform under Repub-
lican presidential administrations and underperform under Democratic administrations (Addoum
and Kumar (2016)). However, our results are not completely driven by industry-level preferences,
10E.g., Bullock, Gerber, Hill, and Huber (2015) and Prior, Sood, and Khanna (2015). Also, see http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/01/03/upshot/how-is-the-economy-doing-politics-may-decide-your-answer.html?_r=2.
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and are also robust to controlling for many other factors that may influence purchase decisions,
such as member characteristics, constituency ideology, local bias, window dressing incentives, and
campaign contributions. Our results also hold when we control for risk preferences, and we doc-
ument that the relation between ideological similarity and portfolio similarity is chiefly driven by
similarity in SRI and risk preferences.
Strikingly, we continue to find a positive relation between political liberalism and SRI within
political parties, providing additional support for behavioral consistency in investing, and confirm-
ing that our continuous measure of ideology provides information about investor tastes beyond
what can be inferred from party affiliation alone. As a further demonstration of behavioral con-
sistency, we find that members tend to disproportionately favor SRI categories that reflect their
favorite political issues, as measured by their committee membership or social issue interest group
evaluations. In particular, members that serve on an environmental (labor) committee or have
above median scores from environmental (labor) interest groups invest more heavily in firms with
a stronger environmental (employee) track record.
We further explore the relation between ideology and SRI by investigating the role that salience
plays in activating investors’ ideological preferences for SRI. Drawing on theory from both the
finance and psychology literature, we hypothesize that liberals’ personal norms related to SRI will
be activated when social issues become more salient, or when the SRI-relevant features of an asset
become more pronounced. Using the British Petroleum (BP) Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April
2010 as an exogenous shock to the salience of social issues, we perform a difference-in-differences
test and find that more liberal members significantly reduced their purchases of stocks with poor
environmental track records in the three months immediately after the spill, indicating that liberals’
distaste for these stocks became especially heightened during this period. However, this relative shift
in tastes disappears after three months, which further suggests that liberal members were affected
by the salient nature of the BP oil spill, which dissipated as time went on after the disaster.
We also find evidence for the role of salience in members’ mutual fund allocations. Specifically,
in contrast to their direct equity holdings, we find no relation between SRI and ideology when we
examine the equities that members hold indirectly through their mutual fund portfolios. The SRI
characteristics of a mutual fund’s portfolio are likely to be less salient than those of an individual
stock, which could be why members do not express their beliefs in their aggregate mutual fund
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holdings. However, we do find that more liberal members are significantly more likely to own
mutual funds whose SRI characteristics are especially salient – namely, funds that are specifically
marketed as being “socially responsible.”
Finally, we depart from SRI and examine behavioral consistency in the domain of financial
ethics. Tahoun (2014) finds evidence of a quid pro quo connection between political donations and
the equity purchases by members of Congress: members are more likely to own the stocks of firms
that have donated to their campaigns in order to signal that they will take actions to benefit the
donating companies. We hypothesize that more intensely ideological members (either liberal or
conservative) would be less willing to engage in this type of quid pro quo behavior, as doing so
would violate their strongly held belief system. Indeed, we find that more ideological members are
significantly less influenced by donations when making investment decisions, further supporting the
notion of behavioral consistency. That is, since political quid pro quo is antithetical to both liberal
and conservative principles, the fact that the most staunch liberals and conservatives are also the
least likely to engage in this behavior suggests that their ideology is a pervasive factor governing
their decisions across the domains of politics, investing, and even ethics.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on investor tastes in general and on
preferences for SRI in particular.11 One study that is closely related to ours is Hong and Kostovetsky
(2012), which finds that mutual fund managers who contribute more to Democratic candidates than
to Republican candidates invest more in socially responsible firms. Our paper is distinct from Hong
and Kostovetsky (2012) in that we are studying investors who are making decisions with their own
money, whereas they investigate mutual fund managers who are investing other people’s money.
Thus, we are able to directly infer the relation between the investor’s personal preferences for
SRI and their ideology. Moreover, because we are able to cleanly identify an investor’s ideology
along with their party affiliation, we are able to demonstrate that SRI preferences are driven by
ideological intensity, rather than partisanship. Another unique aspect of our study is our ability
to identify variation in relative preferences across different social issues. The fact that members
disproportionately favor the SRI categories that reflect their favorite political issues provides even
11Some examples include Statman (2000), Bollen (2007), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), and Riedl and Smeets
(2017).
6
more direct evidence of behavioral consistency across the professional and investing domains, further
supporting the idea that social preferences are deeply rooted in investor psychology.
Not only do we show that the taste for SRI is driven by investor ideology, but we also find
that the expression of this taste is highly driven by salience. Specifically, while liberals may have
personal norms leading them to generally prefer firms that behave in a socially responsible way,
their personal norms are more likely to be activated and thus expressed in their investment decisions
when social issues or SRI characteristics are more salient. We know of no other study showing how
salience can impact investors’ expression of their ideology-based investment tastes. As such, we
also contribute to the growing literature on the importance of salience in investor decisions (e.g.,
Barber and Odean (2008), Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012), Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura
(2014), and Hartzmark (2014)).
Finally, our paper contributes to the large literature examining the relation between politicians
and their donor firms (e.g., Akey (2015), Tahoun (2014), Correia (2014), Claessens, Feijen, and
Laeven (2013), Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010), and Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009)).
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to demonstrate how ideology mitigates the exchange
relationship between politicians and donor firms. This is an important contribution because political
quid pro quo is not only unethical, but it can also harm social welfare when politicians make
decisions to help their donors rather than their broader constituency. Therefore, it is important
to understand the characteristics of politicians that are likely to lead to more ethical behavior.
More broadly, our evidence highlights an interesting relation between political ideology and ethical
behavior in a financial context, and suggests that people with more strongly held ideological beliefs
behave more ethically, at least in this domain.
2. Data
Our work spans several different datasets.12 We obtain detailed information on U.S. Congress
members’ portfolio holdings, trades, and campaign contributions from the Center for Responsive
Politics (CRP), which covers data from 2004 to 2012. We match stock, mutual fund, and firm donor
12Please see our Internet Appendix for more details on our data sources, merging procedures, and descriptive
statistics.
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data to CRSP. Our continuous measure of a member’s ideological leanings on the conservative-
liberal spectrum is based on the member’s Congressional voting records and comes from www.
voteview.com.13 For ease of exposition, we refer to this measure as the Conservative-Liberal Score
(CLS), where -1 is the most conservative and 1 is the most liberal.
To assess members’ socially responsible investments (SRI), we obtain data on firms’ socially
responsible behaviors from MSCI KLD. For each firm in our sample, we create measures for firm
community involvement, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environmental record,
human rights, and product quality. Within each of these categories, the KLD database provides
indicators for the strengths and weaknesses of each firm in a given year. However, the strengths and
weaknesses that KLD measures vary year-to-year, making raw scores difficult to compare across
years, even within the same firm. To address this issue, we first create a firm-year net score by
subtracting the number of total weaknesses from the number of total strengths for each category,
as well as an aggregate measure that subtracts the sum of a firm’s weaknesses from the sum of its
strengths across all categories. Within each category, as well as for the aggregate measure, we then
rank each stock within a year, creating a percentile score. To create a member-year score for the
category and aggregate measures, we calculate the value-weighted average percentile score across
firms in a member’s portfolio in a given year, weighted by a member’s portfolio weights. We refer
to our portfolio-level aggregate SRI measure as SRI Ranking, which is our primary measure of SRI
throughout the paper.
Table 1 summarizes the Congressional and SRI data. We only include member observations
where CLS is available and where we match at least one stock in their portfolio to CRSP and KLD.
Panel A provides summary statistics for the members of Congress in our sample. The average
CLS is -0.044 (slightly conservative), while 49.6% of the sample are members of the Democratic
Party. The average member is 59 years old and 85% of members are male. Members of the Senate
represent 23.5% of our sample. The mean (median) number of stocks held is 17 (5), indicating a
13Specifically, the measure is called the first dimension of the Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores, which is
used in the political science literature to identify how conservative or liberal a politician is. It is estimated using a
member’s entire voting history and gives each legislator a single ideological score ranging from -1 to 1, where 1 is
the most conservative, -1 is the most liberal, and 0 represents a politically moderate voting history. While there are
several NOMINATE scores, the Common Space measure allows members to be compared across chambers and across
years. Note that we reverse the score so that it is increasing in liberalism. See https://voteview.com/data for more
on the construction of this measure. The Common Space DW-Nominate models are discussed in detail in Poole and
Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997, 2007), and Poole (2005).
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large skewness in the number of holdings across members. In Panel B, we provide summary statistics
for the value-weighted average SRI percentile rankings for member portfolios. The average member
portfolio is ranked near the median for each respective category. However, some members have
extreme scores, which are likely driven by undiversified portfolios.
3. Results
3.1. Is Portfolio Similarity Related to Ideological Similarity?
We begin by testing whether members of Congress with similar ideologies hold similar equity
portfolios. We measure portfolio similarity using the Jaccard similarity measure for all member
pairs in a given year. Jaccard similarity measures the overlap between two vectors A and B and is
defined as the size of the intersection of A and B divided by the size of the union of A and B.
J(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B|(1)
That is, for two members, the Jaccard similarity of their equity portfolios is the number of stocks
they hold in common divided by the total number of unique stocks they hold.14 We henceforth
refer to this similarity measure as Portfolio Similarity. The average pair has a Portfolio Similarity
of 0.0165.
Our variable of interest is the absolute value of the difference in the Conservative-Liberal Score
(CLS) between the two members in a pair (|Diff in CLS|). If ideology influences portfolio choices,
then we would expect that members with more similar ideologies would also form more similar
portfolios, i.e., Portfolio Similarity and |Diff in CLS| should be negatively correlated. The average
(median) of |Diff in CLS| is 0.48 (0.44). Other differences between the members may also be
related to their portfolio similarity, so we control for several additional measures of member-pair
characteristics: differences in age (|Diff in Age|), differences in the natural logarithm of wealth (|Diff
in Wealth|), being in the same chamber of Congress, i.e., House or Senate (Same Chamber), having
14We have also run our analysis by incorporating portfolio weights using the cosine similarity measure, and our
results are very similar.
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the same gender (Same Gender), being from the same state (Same State), and the Jaccard similarity
of firm-level campaign contributions (Contribution Similarity). All the continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distributions.
Because our similarity measure is bounded below by zero, we use a Tobit model, given in
Equation (2).15
Portfolio Similarityi,t = β0 + β1|Diff in CLS|i + βXi,t + i,t(2)
where (Xi,t) is a vector of member-pair characteristic controls. Because we have found that
portfolio similarity is non-linearly related to the number of stocks owned by each member in a pair,
we include fixed-effects for each pairwise combination of portfolio size quintiles. In addition, all
models include year fixed-effects, and standard errors are clustered by member-pair. The results
are reported in Table 2.
The variable of interest is the ideological difference between two members, (|Diff in CLS|). The
coefficient estimates for |Diff in CLS| are negative and strongly statistically significant in all models.
For example, in model (1) of Table 2, the coefficient estimate for |Diff in CLS| is -0.007 (t-statistic of
-5.37). This implies that if the ideological difference between the average pair of members decreases
by one standard deviation, then their portfolios become 15.2% more similar. Strikingly, |Diff in
CLS| remains negative and strongly significant when we restrict the sample either to only members
in the same party (model 2) or to only members in different parties (model 3), suggesting that
the continuous ideology measure captures more information than just a binary party membership
indicator.
Examining the control variables, we find that members with larger differences in age and wealth
have significantly less similar portfolios, while those in the same state and in the same chamber have
significantly more similar portfolios. The first two relations are consistent with general demographic
characteristics affecting portfolio decisions, while the latter two suggest that geographic proximity
and information sharing within a group contribute to similar portfolios. Members with more similar
15Our results are robust to using OLS instead of a Tobit model.
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campaign contributions also have more similar portfolios, which is consistent with Tahoun (2014)
who finds that members are likely to own the stocks of firms that donate to their campaigns.
The fact that ideologically similar members hold similar portfolios suggests that political ide-
ology plays an important role in portfolio formation. In the next section, we examine if members’
investment decisions are consistent with their political ideology by studying their decision to engage
in socially responsible investing (SRI).
3.2. Ideology and Socially Responsible Investing
We examine the relation between political ideology and SRI in a multivariate OLS regression
framework, found in Table 3. Our main dependent variable is a member’s value-weighted aggregate
portfolio SRI ranking. We also examine each of the seven SRI categories individually. The equation
for these OLS models is given in Equation (3).
(3) SRI Rankingi,t = β0 + β1CLSi + βXi,t + yeart + i,t,
Our variable of interest is the Conservative-Liberal Score (CLS), which is increasing in polit-
ical liberalism. We control for member characteristics (Xi,t), such as the natural logarithm of a
member’s age (Ln(Age)) and wealth (Ln(Wealth ($))), their gender (Male), Senate membership
(Senate), and the average SRI percentile ranking of donating firms in a given year. Gender, age,
and wealth have all been shown to affect portfolio decisions (e.g., Barber and Odean (2001)). Eg-
gers and Hainmeuller (2014) and Tahoun (2014) show that members of Congress are more likely
to invest in the firms or industries from which they have received campaign contributions.16 All
models include year fixed-effects, and standard errors are clustered at the member-level.
More liberal members are more likely to hold equity portfolios with a higher SRI Ranking,
as coefficient estimates for CLS are positive and strongly statistically significant in models (1) (no
controls) and (2) (with controls). For robustness, we also collapse the panel to the mean by member
16We control for different donor SRI percentile rankings for different dependent variables. For example, for the
aggregate measure, SRI Ranking (model 2), we control for the aggregate SRI percentile ranking of the contributors,
while for Environment (model 8) we control for the environment percentile ranking of contributing firms. For
expositional ease, we report them in a single row (SRI Ranking of Contributors).
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in model (3) and find similar results. Examining the individual SRI category scores, we find that
more liberal members hold portfolios with higher diversity, employee, and environment scores. For
example, the coefficient estimate for CLS in the environment regression is 7.64 (t-statistic = 3.48).
This indicates that a one standard deviation increase in a member’s CLS is associated with an
increase of 3.2 percentile rankings in the environment score of his or her portfolio. Thus, members
of Congress appear to invest in SRI in a way that is consistent with their ideology.
We note that several SRI categories have an insignificant relationship with CLS. It is perhaps
not very surprising that the corporate governance and product quality categories are insignificant,
as both of these categories represent factors that could correspond to underlying firm value (which
both liberals and conservatives would care about), rather than social concerns (where the tastes of
liberals and conservatives would likely differ). For example, some of the subcategories that comprise
the product category are highly related to growth opportunities and intangible assets, such as R&D
and innovation, product quality, and marketing. In addition, the corporate governance category
mainly represents factors related to agency problems and managerial quality. Both liberals and
conservatives would likely care about these issues, as they could affect the financial performance of
their holdings, rather than just social concerns.17
The insignificant relation for the human rights and community involvement categories is perhaps
more puzzling though, as both of these represent pro-social issues that would appear to be consistent
with liberal attitudes toward public policy. When we look more closely at the human rights category,
it appears that the lack of significance may reflect a lack of variability in KLD human rights scores,
rather than a lack of liberal members’ interest in human rights. Many of the subcategories that
make up the human rights category are related to rare and specialized issues such as “Indigenous
Peoples Relations,” “Burma Concerns,” and “Operations in Sudan.” Very few firms have any
human rights concerns or strengths as measured by KLD. In fact, 92% of firms in our sample
have a combined human rights score of zero, making it by far the least variable of the seven SRI
categories. The next least variable category, community involvement, is non-zero 24% of the time,
meaning there are three times as many firms with a non-zero community involvement score as
there are firms with a non-zero human rights score. Thus, one of the reasons we do not detect
17Consistent with our findings, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find no relation between mutual fund managers’
party affiliation and the corporate governance and product quality category ratings of their holdings.
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a relationship between CLS and human rights could be the lack of variation – there are simply
not enough firms with non-zero human rights scores to make a meaningful difference on portfolio
scores.
Finally, we find a rather nuanced set of results when we look more closely at community in-
volvement. The community involvement strengths mainly represent issues related to charitable
giving, both in general and in specific contexts such as in support for housing or education. The
community involvement concerns relate to negative community impacts, such as plant closings or
tax disputes. Liberals likely care a great deal about these issues. However, it could be that these
issues become more salient to investors when they impact their own local community. As reported
in our Internet Appendix, we find that ideology is positively and significantly related to community
involvement for members’ holdings of locally headquartered firms (coefficient estimate of 7.87 with
a t-statistic = 2.17), suggesting that liberals do care about a firm’s community involvement when
it hits close to home (see Section 3.3 for more on the role of salience in SRI).
3.2.1. Robustness
We have performed several robustness checks and alternative specifications to gauge the sensi-
tivity of our results to various assumptions and to rule out alternative explanations. We control
for constituency ideology to address the concern that members structure their portfolios to please
their constituents, rather than to reflect their true beliefs, and continue to find a significant relation
between SRI and CLS. We also find no difference in holdings around election years and in years
with especially close elections, suggesting that members are not simply window dressing their port-
folios in order to gain favor and win an election. Moreover, we find no difference in holdings for
members that are voluntarily retiring and are in their last year in office, where any further incentive
to window dress would be eliminated. In addition, our result are similar if we drop all local stocks
from a member’s holdings or if we drop all the stocks of firms that have donated to the politician,
meaning that our findings are not driven by local bias or the donations channel. Our results also
hold when we drop member accounts that include spousal or dependent holdings and when we drop
holdings in politically sensitive industries. We report select robustness checks in Table 4, but all
the robustness test details and results are included in the Internet Appendix.
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3.2.2. Controlling for Risk Preferences
Previous research has shown that ideology can also impact risk preferences (e.g., Devault and
Sias (2014)), which could be driving our results. In this section, we control for risk preferences in
both our similarity and holdings analysis, with an aim toward quantifying the degree to which the
relation between ideological similarity and portfolio similarity is driven by shared SRI preferences
versus other potential channels.
We examine the relative importance of risk and SRI preferences on portfolio similarity in Panel A
of Table 5. To account for the importance of risk preferences in our portfolio similarity analysis, we
take the following approach. Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (henceforth,
DGTW), we sort stocks into quintiles based on each of the three DGTW risk characteristics: size,
book to market, and momentum (prior year’s stock return), to form 5×5×5 = 125 characteristic-
sorted portfolios. We then measure each member’s portfolio weights across each of the 125 DGTW
portfolios, and define DGTW Similarity to be the Jaccard similarity between each member pair’s
DGTW portfolio weights.
Note that, by construction, DGTW Similarity is highly related to a member’s stock-level port-
folio similarity (Portfolio Similarity), as any time two members hold the same stock, they also hold
the same DGTW portfolio. Thus, a member pair with a perfect Portfolio Similarity of 1 will also
have a perfect DGTW Similarity of 1. However, the converse is not true. Two members could
have very similar DGTW weights (i.e., have shared risk preferences), but may hold different stocks
within the DGTW portfolios if other factors (e.g., differing SRI preferences) drive them to make
idiosyncratic choices within each characteristic portfolio. Accordingly, when we control for DGTW
Similarity in a Portfolio Similarity regression, we argue that we are controlling for the component
of Portfolio Similarity that is driven by shared risk preferences.
We measure shared SRI preferences in a similar way. We characterize each stock holding over the
three SRI components that were shown to be significant in our Table 3 regressions – environment,
employee, and diversity. We form 125 SRI portfolios by sorting stocks into quintiles based on each
of the three SRI component rankings, and then calculate member portfolio weights for each of the
125 portfolios. We define SRI Similarity as the Jaccard similarity between each member pair’s SRI
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portfolio weights. As when we control for DGTW Similarity, controlling for SRI Similarity allows
us to control for the component of Portfolio Similarity that is driven by shared SRI preferences.
In Table 5, Panel A, we report Portfolio Similarity regressions that control for both SRI and
DGTW Similarity. As a benchmark for comparison, in model (1) we report the results of our
Portfolio Similarity regressions for the sample of member-pairs that have both SRI and DGTW
Similarity data, but without controlling for either measure. The coefficient on |Diff in CLS| is
-0.006 (t-statistic = -5.11), which is similar both in magnitude and statistical significance to the
coefficient in model (1) of Table 2, where we use the unrestricted sample. In model (2), we include
DGTW Similarity as a control variable. Not surprisingly, DGTW Similarity is highly related to
Portfolio Similarity. However, DGTW Similarity does not fully explain Portfolio Similarity, as |Diff
in CLS| remains negative and significant, indicating that ideology affects portfolio choice beyond
just through its effect on risk preferences. That said, including DGTW Similarity as a control cuts
the |Diff in CLS| coefficient in half as compared to model (1), indicating that the relation between
ideological similarity and portfolio similarity does in part operate through a shared risk preferences
channel.
In model (3), we remove DGTW Similarity and replace it with SRI Similarity in order to
compare the relative importance of shared risk versus shared SRI preferences. SRI Similarity is
also highly related to Portfolio Similarity, and its inclusion in the model has an even stronger effect
on the |Diff in CLS| coefficient than does the inclusion of DGTW Similarity, reducing it by about
two thirds. This suggests that shared preferences for SRI also plays a major role in the overall
relation between ideology and portfolio similarity, and is arguably a more important factor than
shared risk preferences.
Interestingly, when we include both similarity controls in model (4), |Diff in CLS| is no longer
significant. This does not mean that ideology is not important for portfolio formation, as both
risk and SRI preferences are themselves driven by ideology.18 Rather, it suggests that the relation
between ideological similarity and portfolio similarity can be fully explained jointly through the
channels of shared preferences for risk and SRI.
18We note that in unreported regressions, both DGTW and SRI similarity are negatively and significantly related
to |Diff in CLS|.
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Given that the above analysis shows that risk preferences are an important determinant for
Portfolio Similarity, we also check whether our SRI holdings results are robust to the inclusion of
controls for risk characteristics. In Panel B, we re-run our Table 3 regressions and include value-
weighted portfolio-level averages of firm size, book to market, and prior year’s stock returns as
controls. Our results are very similar to those in Table 3 when we include these risk characteristics,
again suggesting that our findings are not driven by risk preferences related to ideology.
3.2.3. Variation Within Parties
In Table 6, we explore how ideological differences within parties affects SRI, as well as whether
this relationship is linear across the parties. We use the same regression framework used in Table 3.
In models (1) and (2), we restrict the sample to just Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in
order to estimate how ideology matters within each party. The relationship between ideology and
SRI is present in both parties. For example, as Republicans move from being more conservative to
more liberal (i.e., CLS increases), their portfolios also have a higher SRI Ranking.
In model (3), we estimate a model that includes both CLS and an indicator for being a member
of the Democratic Party. CLS remains positive and significant, while the Democrat indicator is
actually negative and significant. Note that the negative Democrat indicator does not mean that
Democrats are less likely to invest in SRI, because Democrats tend to have higher CLS scores (i.e.,
are more liberal) and are actually more likely to engage in SRI. Rather, the negative indicator
suggests there is a non-linearity in the relation between CLS and SRI, and in particular, that there
is a jump in the relation as we move along the ideology spectrum and transition from moderate
Democrats to moderate Republicans.
We explore this non-linear relationship further in model (4) and estimate a regression with four
indicator variables: Liberal Democrat, Moderate Democrat, Moderate Republican, and Conserva-
tive Republican. That is, we split each party into two groups based on the median CLS within
each party. To avoid multi-collinearity, we drop the intercept term. Using an F-test, we find a sig-
nificant difference between the coefficient estimates for Liberal Democrat and Moderate Democrat
(F-statistic=10.72), as well as between those for Conservative Republican and Moderate Republican
(F-statistic=6.15). We find no significant difference between the coefficient estimates for Moderate
Democrat and Moderate Republican, even though the average CLS for moderate Democrats (0.25)
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is significantly higher than the average CLS for moderate Republicans (-0.32). This suggests that
the relation between ideology and SRI flattens out in the moderate range, and that the differences
in SRI are coming from the more ideologically extreme members of the political parties.
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that a continuous measure of ideology is superior
to party indicators, as there is significant ideological variation and investment differences within
each party. Also, by using a continuous measure we are able to detect the non-linear relationship
between ideology and SRI, as moderate members of both parties behave in a similar manner, while
members with strongly held beliefs are influenced more. The fact that ideology is not related to
SRI in the moderate range is an interesting finding, because it suggests that ideology has threshold
effects on investing behavior.
3.2.4. Politically Sensitive Industries
Our measures so far have relied on KLD data to create SRI rankings across different categories.
In Table 7, we examine SRI from the perspective of investments in certain politically sensitive
industries (PSI). In model (1), our dependent variable is PSI Weight, which is defined as the
portfolio weight in industries that are commonly shown to be excluded in SRI investing screens:
Guns and Defense, Mining, Tobacco, Alcohol, Gaming, and Oil and Coal.19 We include the same
controls as in Table 3 and donations are calculated at the PSI-industry level. The coefficient of
CLS is negative and significant, indicating that liberals invest less in PSI than do conservatives.
In model (2), we use a different measure of political sensitivity to measure a member’s industry
allocations. Addoum and Kumar (2016) show that certain industries have higher stock returns when
the President is a Democrat (Democratic industries), while others benefit more when the President
is a Republican (Republican industries). Their logic is that investors perceive that parties will favor
certain industries (perhaps due to ideological reasons) and thus are more likely to enact favorable
policies for those industries when they are in power. For example, during our sample period, the
computer industry benefited the most when the president was a Democrat, while tobacco benefited
the most when the president was a Republican. If parties favor certain industries in their policies,
do they also favor them in their portfolios?
19See Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) and the list of exclusions for MSCI ESG indices (https://www.msci.com/esg-
indexes).
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To answer this question, we follow Addoum and Kumar (2016) and construct a measure (R -
D Ind), which is the member’s portfolio weight in the top five Republican industries minus their
weight in the top five Democratic industries.20 In model (2), we find a significant negative relation
between CLS and R - D Ind, suggesting liberals are more likely to tilt away from Republican
industries and towards Democrat industries, and vice versa for conservatives.
One concern is that our industry analysis is just picking up the SRI ranking effect that we have
already found in Table 3. That is, it could be that the PSI or Republican industries represent firms
with low SRI scores, or perhaps Democrat industries have high SRI scores. To address this, we
repeat our analysis for both industry measures and include the member’s portfolio SRI Ranking as
a control variable in models (3) and (4). SRI Ranking is negative and significant in both models,
consistent with firms in PSI having low SRI scores, as well as firms in Republican industries having
relatively lower SRI scores than firms in Democrat industries. However, even when we control
for SRI Ranking, CLS remains negative and significant, meaning that we are not just picking up
an SRI ratings effect in our industry analysis. Taken together, the results in Table 7 show that
members also express their ideological beliefs in their portfolio allocations at the industry level,
which supports our main finding of behavioral consistency in investing.
3.2.5. Pet Issues
An additional factor driving equity selection by members of Congress could be their interest in
certain “pet issues”. For example, while liberal members may generally favor firms with positive
environmental characteristics, some members may be especially interested in these issues. These
specific preferences might then be reflected in their equity portfolios. To test for this effect, we
use Congressional committee membership and interest group scores to identify whether or not a
member has either environmental or labor concerns as a pet issue. Members have some choice
over their committee assignments, so it is possible that these choices reflect their personal interests.
Furthermore, specific interest group scores allow us to infer a member’s beliefs about environmental
and labor concerns.21 We define two indicator variables for environmental and employee concerns
20We thank Addoum and Kumar (2016) for making these Top 5 industry classifications available in their paper.
21For environmental interest groups scores, we take the average score across a set of environmental groups. For our
employee interest group measure, we take the average labor group interest score and subtract the average business
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as equal to 1 if the member either sits on a related committee, or if the member has an above
median interest group score, and as 0 otherwise.
We present these results in Table 8. We use a similar setup as in our Table 3 regressions
and include the same control variables. Models (1) and (2) test for a relationship between port-
folio environmental and employee SRI rankings and our pet issue indicators. We find positive
and statistically significant relationships in each model. We then test for a relative preference for
environment- and employee-based SRI in models (3) and (4), respectively. The dependent variable
in these models is a member’s environment (employee) score less the mean of their other SRI rank-
ings. We define these as Relative Environment and Relative Employee. The pet issues indicators
remain positive and significant, meaning that these members disproportionately favor investments
in their pet issues relative to their investments in other SRI categories. By directly linking issues
to investments, these results provide strong evidence of behavioral consistency in members’ invest-
ment behavior, and help to further illustrate the complex and multi-dimensional nature of political
ideology that cannot be fully captured by party affiliation.
3.2.6. SRI Taste and Performance
In our Internet Appendix, we also explore how ideological tastes for SRI affects the returns of
member portfolios. We collect member transaction data from CRP and measure the performance of
their stock purchases compared to DGTW characteristic benchmarks for both six- and twelve-month
windows following the purchase date. We then split equity purchases based on their SRI ranking
into high SRI (top quintile) and low SRI (bottom quintile) groups. We regress six- and twelve-
month DGTW-adjusted returns on indicators for high and low SRI stocks, as well as interactions
of the SRI indicators with a liberal indicator, defined as a member having above median CLS.
The high SRI indicator is negative and significant in all models, meaning that high SRI stock
purchases have abnormally low returns for all members of Congress, consistent with the literature
on SRI performance (e.g., see Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2005)
and Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2008)). However, we find no evidence of a performance
differential for liberals as compared to conservatives. In other words, liberals do just as poorly with
group interest score. Like our SRI Ranking variable, interest groups scores range from 0 to 100, with 100 being the
most “pro” score. See our Internet Appendix for more details regarding the data and measures.
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their high SRI investments as conservatives do. Thus, in some cases, liberals’ preference for owning
high SRI stocks may come at a financial cost.
3.3. Salience and SRI
There is a great deal of evidence in the finance literature showing that investor decisions, and
especially those of retail investors, are influenced by salience, i.e., factors that are particularly
noticeable or that draw their attention (e.g., Barber and Odean (2008), Bordalo, Gennaioli, and
Shleifer (2012), and Hartzmark (2014)). There is also evidence in the psychology literature showing
that salience can play an important role in people’s pro-social behavior. Specifically, the norm ac-
tivation model (NAM) predicts that personal norms are “activated” by increased problem salience,
making people more likely to adopt pro-social behaviors that fit their moral beliefs when they are
more aware of the social issue, or are more aware of their ability to combat the problem through
their behavior (Schwartz (1977)). The NAM has found empirical support in many domains of
pro-social behavior, including blood donation, volunteering, and pro-environmental behavior (e.g.,
see De Groot and Steg (2009) for a review of these studies).
We combine the insights related to salience from both the finance and psychology literatures
and hypothesize that liberals will increase SRI in contexts where the social issues are more salient,
or the SRI decisions are framed in a more salient way. We test this hypothesis in the next two
sections where we examine an exogenous shock to environmental salience (Section 3.3.1) and the
salient SRI characteristics of mutual funds (Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1. Shock to Salience of SRI
Environmental issues are likely to be more at the front of one’s mind following a major disaster.
This should activate a liberal’s personal norms related to environmental issues and influence the
degree to which those norms impact their investing decisions. In this section, we use an exogenous
shock to the salience of environmental issues, namely the the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in
April of 2010, to test the role of salience in the relation between ideology and SRI.
Specifically, we examine members’ decisions to buy or avoid environmentally sensitive stocks
around the BP oil spill. We use transactions data from CRP and create a member-month panel
of trades from 2004 to 2012 and define net purchases at the monthly level. We fill in member-
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months with zero trades if the member served in a given year, but did not have any trades during
the month. We focus on the decision to purchase, since stocks sold need to have been previously
purchased and, if the decision to purchase is related to ideology, including them would create a
biased sample. Furthermore, Barber and Odean (2008) find that “attention-grabbing” news is
related to the buying, rather than the selling behavior of individual investors.
We focus on two different dependent variables: (i) the dollar value of purchases of stocks in
the bottom environment quintile scaled by the total dollar value of stock purchases and (ii) the
number of bottom environment quintile stocks purchased scaled by the total number of stocks
purchased. We are primarily interested in whether the average buying behavior of members shifted
in the periods immediately after the spill, and if this shift is related to ideology. To test this,
we use a difference-in-differences framework, and measure how the relationship between CLS and
the purchases of environmentally sensitive stocks changed from before to after the oil spill. We
include four three-month time period indicators around the BP spill: 1 to 3 months and 4 to 6
months, both before and after the spill. We then interact CLS with each of these indicators to
see if changing buying patterns are related to ideology. We include our standard set of member
controls along with CLS, as well as the total dollar amount of stocks bought in a given month
for each member. We display the coefficients for CLS and the time period interactions in Table 9
(time period indicators and other controls are not diplayed for brevity). We also exploit our panel
data by including member fixed-effects in models (3) and (4) of Table 9, dropping time-invariant
member characteristics. This allows us to focus on changes in buying behavior relative to each
individual member’s general desire to purchase these stocks during our sample.
As in our main results using the year-end holdings data, the main effect of CLS is negative
and significant, indicating that on average liberals are less likely to purchase stocks with low
environmental rankings than conservatives during our sample. Strikingly, we find that during the
three months immediately following the BP oil spill, more liberal members significantly reduced
their purchases of low ranked environmental stocks as compared to more conservative members
both in terms of the number and dollar value of their purchases. This is true across all four models.
In contrast, we find no differential buying behavior between ideologies in the months leading up to
the spill, suggesting the spill changed the way liberals looked at these stocks, perhaps by activating
their relative distaste for environmental harm. Interestingly, we also find this differential effect
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dissipates after the first three months, as the interaction becomes insignificant in the (four to six
month) window following the spill. The fact that the buying behavior exhibits a downward spike in
the months immediately following the spill and subsequently dissipates afterwards provides strong
evidence that liberal members were temporarily affected by the salient nature of the BP event.
3.3.2. SRI in Mutual Funds
We also predict that the relationship between ideology and SRI should be stronger for assets
whose SRI-relevant features are themselves more salient. For example, the SRI features of an
individual stock are likely to be more attention-grabbing than those of a portfolio of stocks indirectly
held by a mutual fund, suggesting that liberals should be more likely to express their preference
for SRI in their direct individual equity holdings, rather than indirectly through their mutual fund
investments.
We test this proposition in model (1) of Table 10 by examining the relation between CLS and
SRI in members’ indirect equity holdings. The dependent variable is the value-weighted average
SRI Ranking of members’ indirect equity holdings. We find that CLS is not related to the SRI
Ranking of equities held via mutual funds. The results for indirect equity holdings contrast sharply
with those for direct equity holdings (Table 3), consistent with the idea that the SRI characteristics
of the former are less salient than those of the latter.
However, the way that a mutual fund markets itself is likely more salient than the underlying
equities that it owns. In particular, some funds are known to be a “socially responsible fund” (SRI
fund). In model (2) we estimate a logit model predicting the likelihood that a member owns an
SRI fund. There is no exact definition of an SRI fund, so we match the mutual funds held by
members to three different list snapshots of socially responsible mutual funds: (i) SocialFunds.com,
(ii) U.S. Social Investment Forum, and (iii) Morningstar. We also use keywords, such as “social,”
“responsible,” and “ethic,” to capture CRSP funds that may not be on the lists. Appearing on a list
of SRI funds or having certain keywords in a fund name could make the fund appear more salient
to investors with a taste for SRI. The sample in model (2) is a panel of member-year mutual fund
holdings, and the dependent variable is equal to one if the member owns an SRI fund in a given
year. The set of controls used are the same as our main results, except that we include the natural
logarithm of the number of mutual funds owned. The coefficient on CLS is positive and significant,
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indicating that more liberal members are more likely to own an SRI fund. We find similar results
in model (3) where we change the dependent variable to the member’s total portfolio weight in
SRI funds and use an OLS regression. Taken together, the results of this section suggest that more
liberal members are more likely to express their taste for SRI in the mutual fund context when the
funds have salient SRI characteristics.
3.4. Ideology and the Effect of Donations on Portfolio Choice
Thus far, we have shown evidence of behavioral consistency in members of Congress, as more
liberal members are more likely to engage in SRI than conservative members. We now examine
behavioral consistency in the domain of financial ethics.
Tahoun (2014) demonstrates that members of Congress are more likely to own the stocks of firms
that have donated to their campaigns, and finds evidence suggesting they do so for an unethical
reason, namely to serve as a signal to firms that they will take actions to benefit the donating
firm. In other words, Tahoun’s findings suggests that a positive relation between donations and
stock ownership serves as evidence of quid pro quo between members of Congress and their donors.
In this section, we test whether this quid pro quo behavior is related to the member’s political
ideology.
Political quid pro quo is an unethical form of corruption that is antithetical to both liberal and
conservative principles. For example, there is language in both the Democratic and Republican
platforms against special interest favoritism and “crony capitalism” that result from campaign
finance abuses. Moreover, there is evidence in the psychology literature that both liberals and
conservatives care about the moral value of fairness versus cheating, a value that political corruption
would clearly violate (Haidt (2012)). Therefore, behavioral consistency theory would predict that
members with strongly held ideological beliefs (either liberal or conservative) should be less likely
to engage in quid pro quo with their donors, and thus their investment decisions should be less
sensitive to campaign contributions.
To test this proposition, we exploit the structure of our data and create a member-firm-year
panel that includes donation and ownership data for each member-firm-year. Specifically, for each
year, we calculate a member’s portfolio weight across the union of all of the stocks owned by
any members of Congress plus all the firms that have donated to any members of Congress in
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a given year. This union represents the opportunity set of firms for members in a given year.
This results in a panel with 6,464,936 possible member-firm-years. Our dependent variable is
the member’s portfolio weight for a firm in a given year (Portfolio Weight), while the variable of
interest is the proportion of the total donations the member has received during the year from
the firm (% Donations). We include member-year and firm-year fixed-effects to control for all
characteristics of the member and the firm in a given year. Thus, we gain identification through
differential ownership-donation patterns across the member-firm pairs in each year. Standard errors
are clustered at the member-year level. The results are presented in Table 11. We begin by
replicating the basic result from Tahoun (2014) in model (1). As in Tahoun (2014), a member’s
portfolio weight in a given firm is significantly and positively related to the donations the member
received from that firm.
In the subsequent models of Table 11, we include interactions of % Donations with various
measures of ideology to test whether this ownership-donation relation changes with ideological
extremism. Because CLS is measured on a scale from -1 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal),
we take the absolute value of CLS (|CLS|) as our first measure of ideological extremism in model
(2). In model (3), we use an indicator for Strong Ideology, defined as being in the top quintile of
the absolute value of CLS. The interaction between our measures of ideological intensity and firm
donations is negative and significant in both models, indicating that more ideologically extreme
members are less sensitive to donations when choosing to invest in a given firm.22 These results are
economically meaningful. For example, the results in model (2) mean that the effect of donations is
completely offset by the effect of ideology for somebody that is ideologically extreme (i.e., perfectly
liberal or perfectly conservative). As a practical matter, the results in model (3) indicate that the
highly ideological members of our sample have an ownership-donation relation that is less than half
the size of the relation for political moderates.
Although our hypothesis is based on political extremism, we also consider whether the direction
of ideology affects the ownership-donation relation. In model (4), we include the signed measure
of CLS interacted with donations and find the interaction to be insignificant (t-statistic = 0.24).
22Note, that because we include member-year fixed-effects, the main effect of the ideology measure drops out
of the model, as CLS is constant for a member throughout the sample. However, our results are not sensitive to
this specification, and we continue to find a negative and significant interaction without including member-year
fixed-effects.
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In model (5), we include interactions with separate indicators for both very liberal and very con-
servative members, defined as being in the top and bottom quintile of CLS, respectively. The
indicators are both negative and significant, yet the coefficients are not statistically different from
one another. Thus, the effect does not depend on whether the member is liberal or conservative –
rather, it is the intensity of the member’s ideology that counts. This finding is connected to our
broader research topic because, along with the relation between SRI and ideology, it also supports
the idea of behavioral consistency.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the role of of political ideology in portfolio formation. We overcome
many of the methodological issues facing previous work in this area by examining a unique set of
investors whose political ideology can be precisely captured by a well-defined, continuous measure
and whose personal asset allocation decisions are mandatorily disclosed. Not only do the members
of the U.S. Congress offer an ideal setting to understand the relation between ideology and investing,
they are also a particularly important category of investors whose status as elected officials makes
their behavior of great interest to voters. Thus, it is especially important to understand if their
financial decisions reflect behavioral consistency across their personal and professional domains.
We find robust evidence that members of Congress “put their money where their mouth is” and
invest in a manner consistent with their political beliefs. Specifically, ideologically similar members
hold similar portfolios, and this is largely driven by a strong positive relation between political
liberalism and a preference for SRI. These effects are present even within political parties, indicating
that member preferences are driven by their ideology, rather than partisanship. Indeed, we even find
that members disproportionately favor the SRI categories that reflect their favorite political issues.
Interestingly, we find that salience plays an important role in activating investors’ ideologically-
based preferences for SRI, indicating that the degree to which agents behave consistently with
their ideology depends on how choices are framed and what issues are most noticeable. Thus, our
results suggest economy-wide SRI may not only be driven by trends in investor liberalism, but also
by how much social issues grab liberals’ attention.
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Finally, we also find evidence of behavioral consistency in the realm of financial ethics, as more
ideological investors are less likely to engage in the quid pro quo behavior documented in Tahoun
(2014). As such, our findings also call into question the intentions of politicians who are viewed as
moderate because they tend to vote against party lines. Of course, a moderate may vote against
party lines because he or she has a strong core belief that goes against their party. On the other
hand, perhaps moderate politicians are simply more malleable than ideological politicians, and thus
are more willing to make unethical choices that result in personal gain.
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Variable Definitions
CLS The Conservative-Liberal Score, which ranges from -1 to 1. Liberalism
increases in CLS. For expositional ease, we take the first dimension of
the DW-Common Space and multiply it by -1 to create our measure.
Source: voteview.com
Age Member’s age in years. Source: Wikipedia
Male An indicator variable for whether or not a member of Congress is a
male. Source: Wikipedia
Senate An indicator variable for whether or not a member of Congress is a
Senator in a given year. Source: Wikipedia
Stocks (#) The total number of CRSP-matched equity positions held by a member
in a given year. We also report the total dollar amount of CRSP-
matched stocks held in Table 1. Both are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles of the distribution. Source: CRP
Wealth ($000) Reported CRP net worth if net worth is greater than $0 in a given
year and $0 otherwise. Wealth ($000) is winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles of the distribution. Source: CRP
SRI Ranking The value-weighted average of percentile rankings for net SRI scores
across a member-year’s holdings. A net SRI score is defined as the
total number of strengths less the total number of weaknesses across
the SRI categories. We rank stocks into percentiles after matching
to member holdings. The higher the rank, the higher the SRI score.
Source: CRP and MSCI KLD
SRI Category Ranking The value-weighted average of percentile rankings for net Community
(Corporate, Diversity, Employee, Environment, Human, or Product)
score rankings across a member-year’s holdings. For example, a net
Community score is defined as the total number of strengths less the
total number of weaknesses across the Community category in a year.
We rank stocks into percentiles after matching to member holdings.
The higher the rank, the higher the SRI score. Source: CRP and
MSCI KLD
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Variable Definitions (Continued)
SRI Ranking of Contributors The value-weighted average of percentile rankings for the aggre-
gate SRI score, as well as net Community (Corporate, Diversity,
Employee, Environment, Human, or Product) score rankings,
across the contributing firms of a member in a given year. For
example, a net Community score of a contributor is defined as
the total number of strengths less the total number of weaknesses
across the Community category in a year. We rank stocks into
percentiles after matching to member contributors. The higher
the rank, the higher the SRI score. Source: CRP and MSCI KLD
Election Year An indicator variable for if that year’s reported holdings are the
most recently available during an election year. Source: FEC
Close Election An indicator variable for whether or not a member’s holdings
are the most recently available during an election year and that
member faced a close election in their last election. We define
close election as the Democrat receiving between 47 and 53% of
the vote. Source: FEC
PSI Weight Member portfolio weight in politically sensitive industries (PSI).
PSI includes the following industries: (i) Fama-French 48 In-
dustry Classifications of 4 (Alcohol), 5 (Tobacco), 26 (Guns &
Defense), SIC codes of 800-899 (All Forestry), 1000-1119, 1400-
1499 (Mining), as well as Fama-French 48 classifications of 29
(Coal) and 30 (Oil), (ii) firms having value of 1 for KLD alcohol
involvement, tobacco involvement, gaming involvement, military
involvement, or firearms involvement, and (iii) having ”casino”
in the company name.
D Voting (%) The % of the vote received by the Democratic candidate in the
most recent election. Scaled to be between -1 and 1. Source:
FEC
Democrat An indicator variable for if a member is a Democrat in a given
year. Source: CRP
Liberal Democrat An indicator variable for if a member is a Democrat in a given
year and above the median CLS among Democrats.
Moderate Democrat An indicator variable for if a member is a Democrat in a given
year and below the median CLS among Democrats.
Conservative Republican An indicator variable for if a member is a Republican in a given
year and below the median CLS among Republicans.
33
Variable Definitions (Continued)
Moderate Republican An indicator variable for if a member is a Republican in a
given year and above the median CLS among Republicans.
R - D Ind The member’s portfolio weight in the Top 5 Republican in-
dustries minus their weight in the Top 5 Democratic in-
dustries in a given year. Source: CRSP and Addoum and
Kumar (2016)
Pet Issue Indicator variables for environmental and employee con-
cerns set equal to 1 if the member either sits on a related
committee, or if the member has an above median issue
group score, and 0 otherwise. Source: Charles Stewart and
Jonathan Dunn
Relative Environment (Employee) A member’s environment (employee) score less the mean of
their other SRI rankings.
SRI Fund An indicator variable for whether or not a CRSP-matched
mutual fund held by a member matches to our combined
list of socially responsible funds or if that fund’s name con-
tains a keyword associated with socially responsible funds.
Source: SocialFunds.com, U.S. Social Investment Forum,
and Morningstar
Mutual Funds (#) The total number of CRSP-matched mutual fund positions
held by a member in a given year. We also report the total
dollar amount of CRSP-matched mutual funds held in Table
1. Both are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the
distribution. Source: CRP
% Donations The proportion of the total donations the member has re-
ceived during the year from a firm. Source: CRP
Strong Ideology An indicator variable for if a member is either in the top or
bottom quintile of CLS.
Very Liberal An indicator variable for if a member is in the top quintile
of CLS.
Very Conservative An indicator variable for if a member is in the bottom quin-
tile of CLS.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Members and SRI Rankings
This table reports the summary statistics for member-related variables (Panel A) and net portfolio-
level scores for each of the socially responsible investing (SRI) categories, as well as the composite SRI score
(SRI Ranking) (Panel B). The observation unit is a member-year. All variable definitions are given in the
Variable Appendix. The sample period is 2004–2012.
Panel A: Congressional Members
N Mean Min p25 p50 p75 Max Std
CLS 1,994 -0.044 -0.988 -0.422 -0.085 0.356 0.746 0.423
Democrat 1,994 0.496 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.500
No. of Stocks 1,994 17 1 2 5 18 417 33
Stocks ($000) 1,994 1,129 1 33 136 567 23,500 3,430
No. of Mutual Funds 1,678 8 1 2 5 12 58 9
Mutual Funds ($000) 1,675 692 1 49 171 449 14,000 1,873
Age 1,994 59 30 52 59 65 87 10
Male 1,994 0.848 0 1 1 1 1 0.360
Senate 1,994 0.235 0 0 0 0 1 0.424
Wealth ($000) 1,994 9,680 0 624 1,968 5,477 209,000 27,000
Panel B: SRI Scores
N Mean Min p25 p50 p75 Max Std
SRI Ranking 1,994 50.0 0.0 37.6 50.2 62.6 99.0 20.1
Community 1,994 51.9 0.0 37.9 51.0 66.5 99.0 20.1
Corporate 1,994 47.4 0.0 36.3 47.8 58.9 98.0 20.5
Diversity 1,994 52.6 0.0 38.0 53.5 66.5 99.0 20.8
Employee 1,994 50.2 0.0 42.3 48.6 62.6 98.0 19.0
Environment 1,994 47.8 0.0 39.0 49.0 58.0 99.0 19.0
Human 1,994 48.2 2.3 41.4 51.0 60.0 99.0 16.6
Product 1,994 45.2 0.0 31.7 46.0 59.0 98.0 19.7
SRI Ranking of Contributors 1,804 47.1 0.0 35.1 47.0 58.4 99.0 17.7
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Table 2
Do Ideologically Similar Members Own Similar Portfolios?
This table reports the regression results of portfolio similarity on differences in member ideology. The
unit of observation is a member pair-year. The dependent variable is Portfolio Similarity, or the Jaccard
similarity of holdings in a member pair-year. We employ Tobit regressions censored at zero. The sample
period is 2004–2012. CLS is our proxy for member ideology and is increasing in political liberalism. All
variable definitions are given in the Variable Appendix. We include fixed-effects for each year and for
each pairwise combination of portfolio size quintiles. We cluster standard errors by member-pair in all
specifications. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent p-value < 0.01, p-value <
0.05, p-value < 0.1, respectively.
Portfolio Similarity
All Pairs Same Party Different Party
(1) (2) (3)
|Diff in CLS| -0.007*** -0.026*** -0.022***
(-5.37) (-4.90) (-6.89)
Ln|Diff in Age| -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-8.36) (-5.99) (-5.57)
|Diff in Wealth| -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(-5.57) (-2.68) (-5.45)
Same Chamber 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(9.77) (7.26) (7.02)
Same Gender -0.000 -0.002 0.002
(-0.29) (-1.38) (1.29)
Same State 0.005* 0.003 0.009**
(1.83) (0.73) (2.17)
Contribution Similarity 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.062***
(6.47) (4.74) (3.91)
Constant -0.178*** -0.177*** -0.165***
(-37.80) (-27.35) (-22.05)
Obs. 332,252 168,003 164,249
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Table 6
How Does SRI Vary Within a Party?
This table reports the results of regressions that examine whether SRI by members of Congress varies
within a party. The dependent variable is the value-weighted average percentile ranking of equity SRI scores
for a member’s portfolio in a given year (SRI Ranking). The unit of observation is a member-year. In models
(1) and (2), we restrict the sample to either Democrats or Republicans only, respectively. In model (3), we
include an indicator for membership in the Democratic Party, along with CLS. In model (4), we include
four indicators, which span all members, and drop the constant term. The four indicators are based on
being above or below the median of CLS within each party. All variable definitions are given in the Variable
Appendix. At the bottom of the table, we report the F-test results for the difference in coefficient estimates
within model (4). We employ OLS regressions, include year fixed-effects, and cluster standard errors by
member in all specifications. The sample period is 2004–2012. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * represent p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05, and p-value < 0.1, respectively.
SRI Ranking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLS 22.5405** 16.1443* 19.8411***
(2.52) (1.91) (3.20)
Democrat -9.9191**
(-2.07)
Conservative Republican 73.2031***
(3.56)
Moderate Republican 79.3379***
(3.70)
Moderate Democrat 78.2878***
(3.73)
Liberal Democrat 85.9067***
(3.98)
Ln(Age) -2.9068 -9.6744 -6.3535 -6.6059
(-0.38) (-1.48) (-1.26) (-1.31)
Male -0.3685 3.4055 1.6747 1.4435
(-0.13) (0.99) (0.76) (0.65)
Senate -2.7399 0.4280 -1.6261 -1.1214
(-1.01) (0.16) (-0.86) (-0.59)
Ln(Wealth ($)) -0.5965 -0.2045 -0.3909 -0.4379
(-1.22) (-0.28) (-0.82) (-0.93)
Ln(No. of Stocks) 0.8362 1.6300* 1.3275** 1.2609*
(0.92) (1.72) (2.03) (1.95)
SRI Ranking of Contributors 0.0752** 0.0275 0.0580 0.0508
(2.00) (0.45) (1.63) (1.47)
Constant 63.1644** 90.1282*** 82.5248***
(2.09) (3.17) (3.83)
Obs. 901 903 1,804 1,804
Adj. R2 0.046 0.023 0.049 0.87
Sample Restriction Dem Only Repub Only Full Sample Full Sample
i. Liberal Democrat = Moderate Democrat? Rejected*** (F=10.72)
ii. Conservative Republican = Moderate Republican? Rejected** (F=6.15)
iii. Moderate Democrat = Moderate Republican? Not Rejected (F=0.23)
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Table 7
Does Ideology Relate to Investments in Politically Sensitive Industries?
This table reports the results of regressions that examine how investment in politically sensitive indus-
tries is related to member ideology. The unit of observation is a member-year. In models (1) and (3), our
dependent variable is PSI Weight, which is defined as the portfolio weight in industries that are commonly
shown to be excluded in SRI investing screens: Guns and Defense, Mining, Tobacco, Alcohol, Gaming, and
Oil and Coal. In models (2) and (4), our dependent variable is the weight of equity investment in Republi-
can industries less Democratic industries for a member’s portfolio in a given year (R - D Ind). We use the
definitions of Republican and Democratic industries found in Addoum and Kumar (2016). All variable def-
initions are given in the Variable Appendix. We use OLS regressions, include year fixed-effects, and cluster
standard errors by member in all specifications. The sample period is 2004–2012. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05, and p-value < 0.1, respectively.
PSI Weight R - D Ind PSI Weight R - D Ind
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLS -0.0735** -0.1539*** -0.0614* -0.1122***
(-2.08) (-3.78) (-1.86) (-2.99)
SRI Ranking -0.0014* -0.0047***
(-1.77) (-7.06)
Ln(Age) 0.1936** 0.1454* 0.1877** 0.1219
(2.57) (1.67) (2.55) (1.47)
Male 0.0338 0.0349 0.0355 0.0408
(1.10) (1.08) (1.12) (1.34)
Senate -0.0357 0.0293 -0.0380 0.0208
(-1.19) (1.01) (-1.29) (0.76)
Ln(Wealth ($)) -0.0086 0.0175*** -0.0092 0.0157***
(-1.54) (2.76) (-1.63) (3.02)
Ln(No. of Stocks) 0.0260*** -0.0415*** 0.0279*** -0.0351***
(2.71) (-5.19) (3.09) (-4.42)
SRI Ranking of Contributors -0.0383 0.0467 -0.0434 0.0301
(-0.90) (1.23) (-1.01) (0.84)
Constant -0.5654* -1.0754*** -0.4651 -0.7241**
(-1.90) (-3.06) (-1.65) (-2.17)
Obs. 1,804 1,804 1,804 1,804
Adj. R2 0.060 0.081 0.068 0.168
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Table 8
Do “Pet Issues” Influence SRI?
This table reports the results of regressions that examine whether a member’s “pet issue” is related
to their SRI choices. In particular, we study environmental and employee-related concerns. We define Pet
Issue using committee membership and interest group scores (see the Internet and Variable Appendices for
details). The unit of observation is a member-year. Models (1) and (2) test if having a pet issue is related to
a member’s Environment and Employee portfolio ranking, respectively. The dependent variable in models
(3) and (4) is a member’s Environment (Employee) score less the mean of their other SRI category rankings
in a given year. We define these as Relative Environment and Relative Employee. We include the same
controls found in Table 3, as well as issue-specific firm donation rankings. All variable definitions are given
in the Variable Appendix. We use OLS regressions, include year fixed-effects, and cluster standard errors by
member in all specifications. The sample period is 2004–2012. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,
**, and * represent p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05, and p-value < 0.1, respectively.
Environment Employee Relative Environment Relative Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pet Issue Environment 4.7297*** 2.6026*
(2.80) (1.81)
Pet Issue Employee 5.3665*** 3.1553**
(3.58) (2.31)
Obs. 1,804 1,804 1,804 1,804
Adj. R2 0.020 0.032 0.008 0.014
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9
Salience and SRI: Evidence from the BP Oil Spill
This table reports the results of regressions that test whether ideology is related to how member equity
purchases respond to the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April of 2010. Our sample is a
member-month panel of net purchases. In models (1) and (3), our dependent variable is the dollar value of
purchases of stocks in the bottom environment quintile scaled by the total dollar value of stock purchases,
while in models (2) and (4), our dependent variable is the number of bottom environment quintile stocks
purchased scaled by the total number of stocks purchased. We include 3-month time period indicators around
the BP spill: 1 to 3 months and 4 to 6 months, both before and after the spill. We interact CLS with each of
these time period indicators. All models include these time period indicators (not displayed). Models (1) and
(2) use the same member controls found in Table 3, while models (3) and (4) include member fixed-effects
and drop time-invariant member characteristics. All variable definitions are given in the Variable Appendix.
We use OLS regression and cluster standard errors by member in all specifications. The sample period is
2004–2012. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05,
and p-value < 0.1, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CLS -0.0061** -0.0058**
(-2.22) (-2.12)
1-3 Months After BP × CLS -0.0176** -0.0189** -0.0179** -0.0193***
(-2.26) (-2.48) (-2.44) (-2.75)
4-6 Months After BP × CLS -0.0022 -0.0045 -0.0024 -0.0048
(-0.44) (-0.91) (-0.51) (-1.02)
1-3 Months Before BP × CLS 0.0027 0.0033 0.0025 0.0030
(0.61) (0.79) (0.56) (0.70)
4-6 Months Before BP × CLS -0.0038 -0.0026 -0.0052 -0.0041
(-0.60) (-0.42) (-0.84) (-0.69)
Obs. 43,020 43,020 43,020 43,020
Adj. R2 0.014 0.014 0.117 0.122
Fixed-Effects Period Period
Member and
Period
Member and
Period
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10
Does Ideology Influence SRI Mutual Fund Choice?
This table reports the results of regressions that examine how mutual fund choices reflect both a
member’s ideology and the salience of a fund’s SRI characteristics. The unit of observation is a member-
year. In model (1), we use indirect stock holdings from mutual fund investments to calculate SRI Ranking for
each member-year portfolio. Model (2) uses a logistic regression, where the dependent variable is an indicator
for if a member owns an SRI fund in a given year. In model (3), the dependent variable is a member’s mutual
fund portfolio weight in SRI funds. All variable definitions are given in the Variable Appendix. We use OLS
regression in models (1) and (3), include year fixed-effects, and cluster standard errors by member in all
specifications. The sample period is 2004–2012. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
represent p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05, and p-value < 0.1, respectively.
SRI Ranking of MF Holdings Invest in SRI Fund? SRI Fund Weight
(1) (2) (3)
CLS -0.4624 2.8005*** 0.0217***
(-0.51) (3.41) (2.80)
Ln(Age) 0.8732 2.6305* 0.0230
(0.40) (1.95) (1.36)
Male -0.1046 -0.4604 -0.0032
(-0.11) (-0.96) (-0.35)
Senate 0.1170 -0.5049 -0.0009
(0.15) (-0.83) (-0.15)
Ln(Wealth ($)) -0.4488** -0.2521 -0.0024
(-2.01) (-1.57) (-1.63)
Ln(No. of MFs) -0.9238** 1.0335*** 0.0022
(-2.29) (3.24) (1.16)
Constant 57.2513*** -11.3911** -0.0478
(6.70) (-2.02) (-0.84)
Obs. 1,463 1,463 1,463
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.202 0.248 0.040
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Table 11
Does Ideology Alter the Influence of Donations on Portfolio Choice?
This table reports the results of regressions that examine how member ideology affects the relationship
between firm donations and member equity ownership. Our sample is a member-year-firm panel created
from the cross product of all member-years with an investable set of firms, defined as the full set of firms
collectively owned in member portfolios combined with the full set of firms that have donated to any member
in a given year in our sample. For each member-year-firm, we calculate a member’s portfolio weight in the
firm in that year, setting the weight to zero if the member does not own any stock in the firm in that
year. Portfolio Weight is the dependent variable in all models. We include both member-year and firm-year
fixed-effects and standard errors are clustered by member-year. The sample period is 2004–2012. Robust
t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent p-value < 0.01, p-value < 0.05, and p-value < 0.1,
respectively.
Portfolio Weight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Donations 0.0331*** 0.0609*** 0.0375*** 0.0332*** 0.0443***
(7.29) (4.80) (6.76) (7.22) (5.98)
|CLS| × % Donations -0.0671***
(-2.81)
Strong Ideology × % Donations -0.0204***
(-2.62)
CLS × % Donations 0.0021
(0.24)
Very Liberal × % Donations -0.0221**
(-2.31)
Very Conservative × % Donations -0.0287***
(-3.23)
Obs. 6,464,936 6,464,936 6,464,936 6,464,936 6,464,936
Adj. R2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
Fixed-Effects. Member-Year and Firm-Year
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